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SUMMARY
It’s time to consider a more economically efficient model for financing roads, bridges and other public infrastructure. 
It’s true that Canada has become one of the biggest spenders on infrastructure among OECD countries, at four per cent of 
GDP, but using GDP to measure the share the government should spend on infrastructure is an anachronistic and arbitrary 
measure. We all know it is important that Canada keep pace with maintaining and building the necessary infrastructure to 
maximise our productive capacity and economic prosperity. But how do we know if we are on the right track? How much 
investment is enough, and what is the optimal level of public investment in infrastructure?
This paper proposes a framework for evaluating current and future levels of financing for public infrastructure. Rather than 
relying on arbitrary comparisons with Canadas post war ‘golden age’ of infrastructure investment (an all too common standby 
in political circles), we propose a standard that is based in economic efficiency and which aims to maximise the public benefits 
associated with infrastructure investment.  
 We also take a historical look public capital spending in Canada, as well as the trend toward privatization of public infrastructure 
and core services that began some 30 years ago after the Mulroney government was elected. This trend has seen many core 
services and assets that were once publicly run transition to outright privatization. It is interesting to note that the most heavily 
privatized sectors (utilities and communications) are also the sectors most often spared from the label of ‘inadequate’, a label 
that befalls so much of Canada’s public infrastructure. 
When infrastructure is financed through taxation, there is a tendency for spending to be discouraged to ease the burden on 
taxpayers; however, this inevitably leads to infrastructure maintenance and construction being deferred, with a significant 
deficit inevitably built up. A user-pay model would work to eliminate political influence, create revenue for infrastructure 
renewal, and facilitate an optimal allocation of infrastructure resources. All of this further helps maximise the benefits derived 
from public infrastructure. This model of infrastructure finance and provision could be further advanced and reinforced 
through the creation of provincial and federal bodies whose mandate would be to actively evaluate infrastructure investments 
in their respective jurisdictions, prioritizing funding for the most meritorious projects, and those offering the highest public 
return on investment.
When projects are funded through taxation and access is not priced, there is often little or no incentive for individuals to make 
efficient use of them. The lack of direct accountability means individuals fail to use infrastructure judiciously and sparingly 
to preserve the life of public assets or prevent unnecessary congestion. Moreover, the lack of a clear sense of cost means 
governments do not know the true value that the public places on one type of infrastructure over another. Thus, government 
budgeting for such projects remains inefficient and skewed. The best level and mix of public infrastructure can only be 
determined when government and private providers can reliably establish user demands in a priced (efficient) system.
The current model of funding public infrastructure deprives users of infrastructure as well as government planners from 
vital information they need to make informed and efficient decisions. Both remain unclear on value for money, and cost-
accountability, but are bound by an innate aversion to increased tax-financing. Governments, fully cognizant of both consumer 
attitudes and the need to retain vote-getting power, thus swing between funding necessary infrastructure and allowing 
infrastructure deficits to grow. This paper advocates for a more efficient, accountable system with greater dependence on 
user-pay models and reinforced by and active arm’s length government agency designed to advance merit based project 
selection, and maximise public benefit.
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1Canadian federal, provincial and municipal governments have substantially upped spending 
on public infrastructure in the past decade, making up in part for the downtrend in public 
infrastructure spending since 1970.1 Recently, as we show below, Canada has become one of 
the largest spenders on public infrastructure among OECD countries, at roughly four per cent 
of GDP. As a result, Canada’s average age of public infrastructure stock has fallen dramatically 
from 17.8 years in 2000 to 14.7 years in 20132. Some estimates suggest that Canada’s stock of 
public and private infrastructure is below the OECD average (58 per cent of GDP in Canada, 
compared to 70 per cent on average), implying that despite Canada’s renewed commitment to 
infrastructure spending, it still has some way to go.3
Many have concluded that an increase in public infrastructure spending is currently required 
to make up for declining infrastructure spending in the second half of the 20th century.4 The 
last decade has seen a number of reports that estimate the so-called infrastructure deficit, 
some of which have argued that the cost may be as high as $233 billion to make up for needed 
repair work and new infrastructure. While it is easy to observe the current level of spending 
on infrastructure and how much is required to maintain capital stock, it is another matter to 
establish what is an optimal level of public infrastructure spending. Deficit calculations are not 
informative or helpful in this sense.
There are good reasons to think harder about the amount of public infrastructure spending 
needed in an economy. Simply looking at past trends, such as public infrastructure spending 
as a share of GDP to determine the optimal amount to be spent in the future, is not helpful 
since economic circumstances change. A shift from old to new technologies means that some 
forms of infrastructure spending should die down while others should develop. Further, a shift 
from public to private spending on infrastructure reduces the need for public investment to be 
financed by current or future taxes, the latter arising from debt finance.
After the Second World War, Canada was building up new primary transportation 
infrastructure, which required significant public funding. Once built, expenditure would 
expectedly decline to levels necessary to maintain the quality of capital stock, a cost far less 
significant than financing its initial construction, at least in principle. 
At the same time, Canada, once reliant on Crown investments in infrastructure, took on more 
privatization with the conversion of public telecommunications and transportation firms into 
private companies. Governments themselves grew, requiring more administrative public capital 
with population growth. 
New forms of infrastructure spending were needed as Canada entered the communications age, 
as well as increased urbanization. While urbanization led to people living closer to each other 
(thereby reducing the need for rural infrastructure), it led to new demand for infrastructure as 
1 This data will be presented in more detail below. See also C. Cautillo, N. Zon and M. Mendelsohn, “Rebuilding Canada: 
A New Framework for Renewing Canada’s Infrastructure,” Mowat Research #92, Mowat Centre, University of Toronto, 
August 2014, p. 2.
2 Infrastructure Canada, Departmental Performance Report, 2013-2014.
3 McKinsey Global Institute, “Infrastructure Productivity: How to save $1 trillion a year,” January 2013. Represents telecom, 
water, power, airports, ports and rail. The measurement of public capital stock, however, is not without its difficulties, 
especially with respect to valuation of non-marketed assets like roads and highways.
4 Including numerous publications from the Federation of Canadian Municipalities, the Residential and Civil Construction 
Alliance of Ontario, and notably Saeed Mirza, professor of civil engineering at McGill University.
2the population grew in primarily urban centres. How much infrastructure is needed depends on 
economic circumstances. 
In the paper below, we specifically review three issues. 
The first issue is related to the definition and determinants of public infrastructure spending. We 
look at the choice between public and private ownership of infrastructure and determining the 
appropriate rate of return and the cost for infrastructure projects. 
We then look at the Canadian experience. Specifically, we examine Canada’s historical 
experience in public and private infrastructure investment, including some specific types of 
infrastructure, comparisons with other OECD countries and provincial experience. 
As a final section, we consider two policy issues. The first issue is reliance on pricing for 
infrastructure. The second issue is developing a more transparent approach to measuring the 
returns to public infrastructure spending in the absence of pricing. 
WHAT DO WE MEAN BY OPTIMAL PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE?
If there is one area of agreement in Canada and most economies, it is the need to build up more 
public infrastructure. In the 2015 federal election, all three leading parties argued in favour of 
more infrastructure spending, especially on urban transit. The debate has been over the size of 
such spending, ranging from the recent 2015 budget plans of the Conservative government to the 
largest new spending programs proposed by the Liberals. 
Infrastructure is capital stock acquired to provide or move goods, services and people in an 
economy including rail, air, transit and road transport, ports, bridges, pipelines, communication 
services, power, pipelines, etc. Some would also include education and other related public 
expenditures that build human capital, even though a portion of education expenditures supports 
consumption rather than investment. Generally, buildings and other public administration capital 
are needed to support general government services. Thus, the definition of public infrastructure 
varies depending on its use, although we shall focus on the conventional definition related to 
physical capital.5
Measuring the stock of public infrastructure is not without its difficulties6. Many public assets 
are not marketed, such as roads, highways, bridges and parks. While statistic agencies can 
measure a book value of public capital by adding up past expenditures, its economic value is 
more difficult to measure without understanding the economic returns to investment. An asset 
may also be depreciated, requiring knowledge of its specific life cycle, which is possible to 
analyze or derive with engineering data. However, economic depreciation, measured as the 
reduction in the value of an asset over a period, is much more problematic without knowing 
valuation. The difficulty of measuring public infrastructure makes it more difficult to determine 
5 A similar point is made by E. Gramlich, “Infrastructure Investment: A Review Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 
XXXII, September 1994, pp. 1176-1196.
6 
The difficulties of measuring public infrastructure stock are discussed in J. Mintz & R. Preston, Infrastructure and 
Competitiveness, John Deutsch Institute, Queen’s University, 1993. 
3the optimal level of public infrastructure spending, as well as determining the priorities for 
public capital spending.
Few would disagree that public infrastructure can help improve economic growth.7 Added 
infrastructure stock would raise the productive capacity of an economy. It also increases output 
per worker (productivity) whether publicly or privately financed. But like all types of spending, 
a limit is reached beyond which infrastructure spending leads to suboptimal returns and crowds 
out valuable competing priorities. Thus, establishing a framework to determine the optimal 
amount of infrastructure needed in an economy is a key consideration for both government and 
industry.
Several theoretical issues could be considered in determining the optimal size of public 
infrastructure spending. Below, we review two specific points relevant to the policy 
prescriptions in this paper: (i) private versus public infrastructure spending and (ii) determining 
the optimal choice of infrastructure capital stock.
(i) Public versus Private Infrastructure
Studies that compare public infrastructure presume that governments are the suppliers of such 
infrastructure. Yet, many countries, including Canada, have changed their views on ownership 
and control by privatizing — supported by regulation — what has typically been viewed as 
public infrastructure. Privatization became more popular in the United Kingdom during the 
1980s when rail transport, telecommunications, power and social housing were privatized by 
the government to improve efficiency. Other countries privatized companies as well, following 
the U.K. example, including Canada after the Mulroney government was elected in 1984. 
More recently, where outright privatization has not been used, it has become fashionable for 
governments to contract out the supply of the public services to private firms that design, 
construct and operate a project through a public-private partnership.
At one time, core Canadian infrastructure was publicly owned and administered including rail, 
airports, telecommunications and roads. Canadian National Railway, Air Canada and various 
government telecommunications companies later became privatized, following trends in other 
countries. Currently, quasi-government bodies operate airports that fully recover costs with user 
charges. Publicly owned companies operate transmission and distribution, although privatized 
power companies operate in many provinces, especially Alberta. 
In many instances, what was once typically public infrastructure has now become private 
infrastructure. Thus, the line between public and private infrastructure becomes blurred and, 
to the extent privatization has taken hold, public spending as a share of total infrastructure 
spending would naturally decline over time. Comparing public infrastructure spending 
7 A general result, by no means unanimous, is that the elasticity of GDP with respect to infrastructure stock is .15 – double 
infrastructure and GDP rises 10 per cent. Studies have tended to overestimate the positive benefits of infrastructure 
spending by not separating demand effects from higher income induced by more spending from supply effects from 
added capacity. Further, most studies do not take into account timing, spillover effects and heterogeneity in projects, 
since some spending can result in less GDP due to rent-seeking and corruption. See L. Serven, “Infrastructure 
and Growth,” Research Brief, World Bank, 2010. http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/
EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:22629797~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:469382~isCURL:Y,00.html
4across countries should also account for differences between private and public ownership of 
infrastructure. 
Even with the private supply of infrastructure, governments could still be involved by regulating 
prices and standards to protect consumer interests or subsidizing capital construction. The 
motivation for government involvement in the supply of infrastructure is based on four factors:
1. Public Goods: Some services are non-rivalrous in consumption (meaning that consumption 
by one person does not diminish consumption by another) or non-excludable (the nature of 
the good is such that access to, or consumption of the good cannot be limited). The classic 
examples are defence and law and order, which are provided by governments, given their 
value to the broad population. At the municipal level for example, public infrastructure often 
includes some forms of transportation, sewage and drainage, lighting and parks, each of 
which has varying degrees and combinations of rivalrousness and excludability. 
2. Economies of Scale: When very large capital-intensive projects are involved, only one or 
a few private companies may be able to operate at a level sufficient to achieve the lowest 
unit costs of production. This is particularly important with respect to the provision of 
infrastructure such as broadband, transmission lines and roads, which are efficiently 
provided by one or a few providers. In this case, a natural monopoly arises whereby the 
private producer(s) could charge a price in excess of costs by limiting supply. Output could 
expand if price is more than incremental variable costs, but the company may not be able to 
profitably cover fixed costs. In this case, a government enterprise could operate at a loss by 
providing supply where price is set at incremental cost, or subsidize a private producer to 
achieve a higher level of output, best illustrated by the construction of the Canadian Pacific 
Railway in the latter part of the 19th century8. 
3. Spillovers (externalities): Spillovers or externalities arise when individuals or firms take 
some action which has an impact on others around them, without being compensated for the 
benefit to others or forced to pay compensation for the harm imposed on others. Pollution 
is an example of harmful spillover costs imposed by producers on others in society, while 
the diffuse benefits resulting from innovation, research and development can be hard to 
fully capture/monetize for private firms. Network externalities arise, as in the case of 
transportation and communication, when one part of the system provides benefits to other 
parts by reducing transaction costs or improving overall demand for a service. 
4. Merit Goods: Government may provide goods and services simply because they are 
meritorious (such as subsidizing broadband and roads in rural areas). While merit 
considerations are relevant to voter demands and political preferences, the concept is loose 
in application as it can provide a justification for many public expenditures. We discuss 
political decisions and voter preferences below since it is typical for political decisions to be 
based on current voter preferences, ignoring the preferences of future voters who will bear 
some of the cost of public spending. 
8 As noted by a reviewer of this paper, the Canadian government arguably over-subsidized the development of the CPR. We 
agree this is likely true. Norman Bonsor’s 1995 article, “Competition, Regulation and Efficiency in the Canadian Railway 
and Highway Industries,” for the Fraser Institute, also makes this case. He further argues that this subsidy — along with 
that of the highway system — and also regulations surrounding the rail industry from 1927-1991, introduced tremendous 
distortions into the transportation market. 
5Each of these market failures gives rise to a rationale for government intervention in 
infrastructure markets. However, the type of intervention can vary. The infrastructure could be 
designed, constructed and operated by a government entity (such as a department, agency, non-
profit government-controlled organization or Crown corporation). Alternatively, as suggested 
above, the infrastructure could be privately supplied with government regulatory control over 
pricing and standards to protect consumer interest and ensure an efficient supply9.
In either the case of private or public provision, costs can be covered through direct consumer 
pricing. With respect to public supply, governments can assess user fees related to consumption 
for water, power, sewage, drainage, transit and major roads. If privately supplied, the firm could 
recover costs through pricing of the service such as two-part pricing (an upfront fee to access the 
service and a charge per unit of use). Where a supplier may then be in a monopolistic position to 
charge prices in excess of incremental costs, governments can be justified in regulating prices to 
ensure that market power does not determine pricing, and consumer interests are protected. 
A key aspect of privatization is that the cost of infrastructure is covered by user charges (and, 
perhaps, government subsidies where justified). Pricing is particularly important in determining 
the return to infrastructure, since prices are a measure of consumer benefits based on the degree 
to which people are willing to give up other expenditures to use infrastructure services. 
(ii) Optimal Choice of Infrastructure Spending 
The concept of a public infrastructure deficit, which is commonly used in policy circles, should 
be defined as the difference between the current and the optimal amount of infrastructure 
stock (a deficit arises if the optimal amount is more than the current level of capital stock).10 As 
discussed above, while it is relatively simple to measure current capital flows, it is a much more 
complicated matter to accurately estimate the capital stock, since many assets such as parks, 
roads and bridges have no market value to estimate. Instead, a value of assets based on historical 
or inflation-adjusted expenditures and estimated capital stock lives are used to measure the 
value of infrastructure stock. Even once measuring capital stock, it is very difficult to establish 
the optimal level of infrastructure stock without information on returns and costs as discussed 
below. 
In the private sector, the optimal choice of capital stock is based on a well-known set of 
principles. Firms invest in capital if the expected rate of return on the project is at least as great 
as the cost of capital11. If the expected rate of return is below the cost of financing, the project 
9 Price regulation for many infrastructure projects like electrical transmission and distribution, pipeline, telecommunications, 
etc. has been based on providing the supplier a normal rate of return on capital or a price that recovers costs net of a 
productivity stretch factor (performance-based regulation).
10 
Several measures of infrastructure deficits can be used, including engineering data, economic rates of return and political 
voting preferences (the latter often ignoring preferences of future voters). See E. Gramlich, “Infrastructure Investment: A 
Review Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXXII, September 1994, pp. 1176-1196. 
11 
Throughout, the cost of capital is defined as the hurdle rate or financial cost to determine the acceptability of a project 
(depreciation costs are subtracted from rates of return to capital). As we note in this section, the hurdle rate is adjusted for 
risk and other factors, particularly taxation. If risk is added to the cost of capital, the expected rate of return on the project 
should be at least as high as the hurdle rate, including risk costs. Alternatively, risk costs could be subtracted from the 
rate of return to capital so that the rule for acceptability becomes the net-of-risk rate of return being at least as high as the 
riskless cost of finance. As is well known in project analysis, one can adjust returns or financing costs to determine the 
appropriate level of capital investment. 
6will be unprofitable and therefore rejected. To maximize the value of the firm’s profits over time, 
investment takes place until the rate of return on capital is equal to the cost of capital. Too little 
investment results in giving up profitable opportunities. Too much investment results in lower 
profits.
For governments, a similar decision rule is involved in principle. The optimal amount of 
infrastructure capital is determined at the point in which the marginal return from additional 
capital spending is equal to the hurdle rate. However, unless prices are charged for the use of 
infrastructure, it is necessary to use other, often more subjective or speculative, measurements 
to determine the return to infrastructure. This requires the use of cost-benefit analysis whereby 
benefits are the estimated value to consumers of using the public infrastructure even if they do 
not pay for the product. Such benefits are adjusted by including net benefits or costs in related 
markets that arise from more infrastructure spending.12 
As for the cost of capital, it should be remembered that public infrastructure is often tax-
financed, whether by imposing levies on the current population, or deferred through debt 
finance, to be repaid at a later time by future taxpayers.13 If a distortionary tax is used to finance 
infrastructure and governments minimize the economic cost of raising taxes over time with debt 
finance, the cost of finance is theoretically increased by the value of lost productive activity in 
the private sector due to taxation. Assuming that a capital tax on private investment is used to 
finance public infrastructure14, the cost of financing public infrastructure (CF) is equal to the 
following:
CF = R/(1-tE)
R = interest rate, t = marginal effective tax rate on private capital and E = elasticity of private 
capital stock demand with respect to tax rate. 
As a benchmark, the marginal effective tax rate on capital is 19 per cent and the elasticity is 
1.0.15 This would imply that the government’s cost of finance would be 23 per cent above the 
12 Measuring the rate of return to unpriced infrastructure services would require estimating the marginal willingness of 
consumers to pay for the service, which must be estimated from demand analysis. Indirect benefits are equal to changes in 
demand or supply in related markets multiplied by the difference between consumer and producer prices (consumer prices 
reflect what consumers are willing to pay for a product and producer prices reflect the opportunity cost of using resources 
to produce the product). If consumer and producer prices are equal to each other (no distortions), no adjustment is needed 
for indirect effects. However, if there are economic distortions (such as taxes and subsidies), indirect net benefits should 
be included. If the consumer price is more (less) than the producer price and the related market expands, there is a positive 
(negative) net benefit. 
13 
B. Dahlby and M. Smart provocatively suggest that only tax finance should be used for infrastructure unless debt is covered 
by future user charges to cover its costs. See B. Dahlby and M. Smart, “The Structure and Presentation of Provincial 
Budgets,” SPP Research Papers, 8(25), School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, 2015.
14 This result is based on a simple two-period model in which private and public capital in production are complementary 
in their use as inputs. The government finances its public infrastructure with a tax on private investment with the aim to 
maximize economic well-being over the two periods. The optimal decision for one more dollar of public infrastructure 
spending is derived as above. Readers are welcome to request the mathematical derivation. 
15 The elasticity of one is consistent with a Cobb-Douglas production function to represent the Canadian economy. The 
marginal effective tax rate is taken from D. Chen & J. Mintz, “The 2014 Global Tax Competitiveness Report: A Proposed 
Business Tax Reform Agenda,” SPP Research Papers, 8(4), The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, Calgary, 
Alberta, February 2015.
7market interest rate. This financing cost can be larger than the interest cost faced by private-
sector producers even if government debt can be issued at a lower risk cost than private debt.16
A different economic cost of tax-adjusted cost of capital would be realized if other taxes were 
chosen to finance infrastructure costs. If a consumption tax were chosen, the cost of public 
infrastructure would be less since consumption taxes distort less the allocation of resources 
in an economy compared to capital taxes. Also, estimates of the marginal cost of taxation, 
especially for the corporate income tax, can be substantially higher than what is used above. 
Dahlby suggests that provincial corporate taxes can be two times higher than a consumption 
tax.17 Recently, some governments such as Ontario and Alberta have increased reliance on the 
most distorting taxes (personal and corporate taxes), requiring a higher cost of finance to be 
used to evaluate infrastructure projects.
While these general observations in determining the optimal infrastructure stock are helpful 
guidelines, the implementation of these rules requires careful analysis. While we often think 
of infrastructure as providing higher net benefits to the economy, it will not always be the 
case if infrastructure spending is used to curry the favour of voters (the “bridge to nowhere” 
phenomenon). Measuring the return to infrastructure to ensure both the appropriate quality and 
quantity of stock is a task that will be further discussed below. 
CANADIAN CAPITAL SPENDING: NATIONAL HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In looking at the long-term aggregate data available on public and private capital investment in 
Canada, there are two clearly defined trends, that of declining investment following the 1960s, 
and a reversal to increasing expenditures following the late 1990s. Based on available Statistics 
Canada data, we are not able to completely tease apart public from private investment in this 
longer series, though later in the paper we will be able to do so for the period following 1991.
Many of the select industries presented below in Figure 1 have traditionally been characterized 
exclusively by public capital expenditures, such as water and sewage, health care and social 
assistance, and public administration. Others, such as electricity and gas, have seen a transition 
from being largely publicly financed and owned, to privately held. This transition is illustrated in 
Figure 2. 
16 
As pointed out in the private-public partnership literature, the government could have a lower cost of finance than a private 
producer due to better credit in capital markets. However, this ignores the cost of tax financing. For a discussion of credit 
costs for public and private producers, see Matti Siemiatycki & Naeem Farooqi, “Value for Money and Risk in Public–
Private Partnerships, Evaluating the Evidence,” Journal of the American Planning Association, Volume 78, Issue 3, 2012.
17 
B. Dahlby, “Reforming the Tax Mix in Canada,” SPP Research Papers, 5(14), The School of Public Policy, University of 
Calgary, 2012.
8FIGURE 1 PUBLIC & PRIVATE CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN CANADA, SELECT INDUSTRIES 1960 – 2013 
Note: Includes building, engineering, machinery and equipment, and intellectual property asset classes.
Sources: Statscan Table 031-0002 and World Bank Development Indicators.
FIGURE 2 PUBLIC & PRIVATE CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN CANADA - UTILITIES
Sources: Statscan Table 031-0002 and World Bank Development Indicators.
The data in figure 2 are also not as disaggregated as we would like, though the trend is rather 
informative. Figure 2 shows public versus private shares of capital investment in the aggregate 
Statistics Canada category of Utilities, which is composed of electric power generation, 
9transmission and distribution, natural gas distribution, and water, sewage and other systems. The 
graph illustrates declining investment into the late 1990s, followed by a reversal to increasing 
spending thereafter, similar to the trend seen in Figure 1. In addition, Figure 2 also clearly 
illustrates a shifting of emphasis in utility capital investment from the public to private sector. 
While public utility investment was nearly five times that of private in 1991, by 2013, private 
investment had grown to roughly 60 per cent of public, representing a more than doubling of 
private spending over the early 1990s. In absolute terms, this represented a shift in private 
spending from just over 15 per cent of total utilities capital investment in 1991 to a peak of 37 
per cent in 2013 (Figure 3).
FIGURE 3 PRIVATE CAPITAL INVESTMENT AS A SHARE OF TOTAL - UTILITIES
Sources: Statscan Table 031-0002 and World Bank Development Indicators.
Referring back to Figure 1, we can see that the utility class of capital assets has consistently 
accounted for nearly half of public capital investment in Canada — if public administration 
is left out of the picture — establishing the utility asset class as a significant and primary 
component in the makeup of public capital investment. Considering the shift from public to 
private — illustrated in Figure 2 — and given the significance of utility assets in Canada’s 
capital portfolio, we can see that there has been a rather dramatic shift in the composition of 
capital financing, and thus provision and ownership of core infrastructure over the last 25 years.
Increased emphasis on private investment can also be seen in Figure 4, showing capital 
investment for Statistics Canada’s aggregate Information and Cultural Industries capital asset 
class, composed of telecommunications, broadcast and print.18 Unfortunately, from Statistics 
Canada data we cannot disaggregate the contributions of these individual industries, though 
we believe it is likely that a significant portion of spending trends here are accounted for 
18 For a full accounting of Statistics Canada’s NAICS 51- Information and Cultural Industries asset class, see  
http://stds.statcan.gc.ca/naics-scian/2007/ts-rt-eng.asp?criteria=51
10
by telecommunications, with increased private spending accounting for the development of 
Canada’s wireless network, and decreased public investment representing government’s general 
exodus from the telecom industry. Regardless, the shift away from public spending across this 
asset class has been significant. While public capital investment in this asset class represented 
nearly 18 per cent of total investment in 1991, by 2001 this had dropped to a mere 1.7 per 
cent, representing less than 1/8 of what it had been only a decade earlier. There have been 
some modest gains in public spending among this asset class since the low point seen in 2001; 
however, in 2014 public spending was just over six per cent of total investment, representing 
roughly a third of what it had previously been in 1991.
FIGURE 4 PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CAPITAL INVESTMENT: INFORMATION AND CULTURE INDUSTRIES 1991-2014
Sources: Statscan Table 031-0002 and World Bank Development Indicators.
Given these shifts toward private provision of historically public asset classes, can we reasonably 
expect historical public capital investment levels to be informative for the development of 
current and future public capital spending policies? 
Considering the increased private participation, along with the thesis presented earlier, that 
following the expansion of Canada’s post-war core infrastructure we would expect a decline 
in overall capital investment as major capital erection costs give way to less costly long-term 
maintenance spending, it is not clear that historical levels should be regarded as benchmarks for 
current public capital expenditure. This is not to suggest that current spending is either optimal 
or inadequate, but only to suggest that historical levels may not be a useful benchmark to 
evaluate current public capital spending19. 
19 
Ontario has argued that public infrastructure spending should be five per cent of GDP, which was similar to a half century 
ago. See “Wynne leads call for huge increase in federal infrastructure spending,” CBC, August 6, 2014.  
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/wynne-leads-call-for-huge-increase-in-federal-infrastructure-spending-1.2729585
11
Though some continue to gauge the adequacy of current capital spending according to post-
war historical trends, we would argue based on the theoretical foundation presented earlier, 
that governments should rather establish efficient public demand through the pricing of 
infrastructure. 
THE AGE OF PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE IN CANADA: RECENT DATA
On the whole, Canada’s public capital spending trend has been positive for some 14 to 15 years, 
and this uptick in spending has translated into tangible capital renewal as demonstrated by the 
most recent data available on the age of Canada’s infrastructure. 
FIGURE 5 PUBLIC CAPITAL INVESTMENT BY SECTOR - CANADA
Sources: Statscan Table 031-0002 and World Bank Development Indicators.
In Figure 5 above, we can see that public capital investment, leaving out public administration, 
has almost doubled from a low of roughly 1.4 per cent of GDP to a current high of 2.8 per cent. 
This spending increase helps to explain the clear downward trend in the average age of core 
public infrastructure we see in Figure 6, and the corresponding increase in the average useful 
remaining life. 
12
FIGURE 6 PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE IN CANADA - AVERAGE AGE & PERCENTAGE OF USEFUL LIFE
Sources: Infrastructure Canada and Statscan National Economic Analysis Division. 
Note: Core public infrastructure (roads, bridges, transit, water, wastewater, culture, and sports and recreation 
infrastructure) owned by all levels of government including Crown corporations and provincial agencies. Data for 2013 
based on forecast. 
The “useful life” is a concept which refers to the average productive duration which can be 
expected at the time of acquisition. A 2006 Statistics Canada report titled The Age of Public 
Infrastructure in Canada20 refers to this concept as the “service life and mortality function” and 
defines it as:
“(an asset’s) productive life … the length of its useful life at the time of its acquisition. For 
example, an asphalt roadway — whether it is a road or highway has a mean service life of 28 
years …The mortality function reflects the retirement (decommissioning) of assets from capital 
stock when the assets reach the end of their useful life. The function used for asset retirement is 
represented by a normal distribution truncated at the tails. The distribution reflects service life 
variation due to asset quality and maintenance. Assets may be retired for various reasons. They 
can be exported, sold for scrap, dismantled, demolished or simply abandoned.”
The useful life of an asset at the time of acquisition represents an average duration based on the 
characteristics of the structure. However, useful duration is also a function of maintenance and 
so can both contract and expand based on the degree to which optimal maintenance scheduling 
is adhered to.
Over the period of 2000 to 2013, the average age of core public infrastructure fell 3.1 years, from 
17.8 to 14.7 years old on average. Spending on additions and maintenance over this period have 
had a significant corresponding impact on the percentage of useful life remaining for core public 
infrastructure, which has seen a nearly 40 per cent increase in useful life span over the base 
period (1-C/B), from 34.1 per cent of useful life remaining to 47.5 per cent.
20 Valérie Gaudreault and Patrick Lemire, The Age of Public Infrastructure in Canada.
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CANADIAN INFRASTRUCTURE SPENDING: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
In this section, we will look at how Canada’s capital flows compare to those of similarly 
developed OECD nations using capital investment data across a selection of public capital 
asset classes. This comparison helps give a sense of how Canada stacks up to other developed 
nations in terms of infrastructure spending, and offers some insight into short-term trends in the 
comparative development of domestic capital and productive capacity. 
FIGURE 7 PUBLIC INVESTMENT, GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION - OECD SELECT COUNTRIES
Notes: To help illustrate changing trends over time, we have included red, yellow and green markers indicating spending 
averages in past periods. Red is for oldest, yellow for mid, green for recent and the solid bar indicates the period 
containing the most recent data. Missing data points indicate spotty OECD data. We opted to include data where 
available, rather than exclude nations that did not have full data sets for the total period of observation. 
Source: OECD Metadata.
Figure 7 illustrates investment flows in public gross capital formation for a selection of OECD 
nations between 1995 and 2013. In the current period between 2006 and 2013, we can see 
that Canada maintained a relatively strong comparative average performance of four per cent 
of GDP, while the pack average (nations shown) was roughly 3.3 per cent. However, in the 
preceding period between 2001-2005 (yellow circles), Canada finds itself below the pack average 
of 3.5 per cent21, with roughly 3.2 per cent of GDP going to public capital investment. In the 
earliest period of 1995 to 2000, Canada is even farther below the pack average of 3.6 per cent, 
with 2.95 per cent. 
Referring back to the Canadian capital investment data presented earlier in Figures 1 through 
5, we can see a corresponding trend of increasing capital expenditures following the late 1990s. 
Unfortunately, both the Canadian data and the bulk of OECD nation data used for Figure 6 do 
21 
We do note that Canada was also experiencing rapid GDP growth from an economic boom during this period, and that this 
may bias the relative performance downward.
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not go back any further. In the absence of this data, we cannot make a meaningful evaluation 
of the comparative trends in capital expenditures over the full course of Canada’s prolonged 
period of declining capital investment following the 1960s. However, what we can see from 
the available data is that the reversal (from declining to increasing) of Canada’s public capital 
spending trend in the late 1990s did make a meaningful comparative difference with regard 
to the capital spending of similarly developed nations. Although the trend in spending has 
been positive in Canada for some 20 years now, it is only in the most recent period that total 
expenditure levels have been high enough to bring Canada above the pack average. 
From Figure 7 we can see that as Canada’s period of prolonged capital spending hit a low 
point in the mid- to late 1990s, Canada had in fact fallen behind other developed nations in 
terms of capital spending. Conversely, Canada’s renewed commitment to capital/infrastructure 
investment has seen our standing among developed nations substantially improved. However, 
as this is only with regards to rather recent investment flows, it is entirely likely that the recent 
uptick in investment has done more to compensate for past shortages, rather than offer any 
tangible comparative growth relative to other developed OECD nations. 
Figure 8 illustrates the percentage of gross fixed capital that is accounted for by national public 
versus private entities, and thus how public capital spending is keeping pace with private. 
Similar to Canada, where private capital spending has outpaced public in core areas, the general 
trend across this select group of OECD nations appears to also show some minor amount of 
retrenchment in public spending. This is illustrated by the many nations with one or more past 
period markers clustered at the top of, or sitting above, the bars representing the current period 
average.
FIGURE 8 GROSS FIXED CAPITAL, PUBLIC INVESTMENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL INVESTMENT –  
  OECD SELECT COUNTRIES
Note: Group average represents simple average. Source: OECD Metadata.
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Turning to the key category of inland transport infrastrucure, we see in Figure 9 a story similar 
to that in Figure 7 (Public Investment, Gross Fixed Capital Formation - OECD Select Countries). 
Canada shows relatively good performance in the current period with 1.15 per cent of GDP, over 
the pack average of 0.96 per cent. However, looking back to past periods, Canada was clearly 
not performing as well, with spending below the pack average in the three preceding periods. 
Canada’s spending between 2005-2009 represented only 0.86 per cent of GDP, versus a pack 
average of 1.05. Between 2000 and 2004, Canada spent 0.58 per cent versus a pack average of 
0.93, and 0.68 per cent versus a pack average of 0.93 between 1995-1999. We note, however, that 
over the series, Canada’s spending on inland transport infrastructure as a percentage of GDP 
was consistently higher than that of its North American counterpart, the United States. It grew 
to nearly double that of the U.S. in the most recent period which has seen Canada’s spending 
increase dramatically.
FIGURE 9 TOTAL INLAND TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT – SELECT NATIONS
Note: Group average represents simple average.
Source: OECD Metadata.
Though the absence of comprehensive long-running capital flow and stock data prevents us 
from conducting a more granular analysis22, available data do give us a sense of where Canada 
currently sits among similarly developed nations. While increased investment in Canada’s 
capital stock has been significant in recent years, a prolonged period of weak investment in past 
years has had a negative impact on the adequacy and quality of Canada’s capital stock, and this 
continues to be a source of concern for fedral and provincial governments.23 
22 
This is area of study that would benefit greatly from improved consistency in international data, as well as public access to 
longer spans of comparative historical data sets, which are currently not available
23 
See the Federation of Canadian Municipalities “Canadian Infrastructure Report Card” & Saeed Mirza’s “Danger ahead: the 
coming collapse of Canadas municipal infrastructure”
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CANADA’S INFRASTRUCTURE GOING FORWARD: THE ROLE FOR POLICY
Looking at the current context, we feel there are two policy initiatives that would greatly 
contribute to increased efficiency in the provision of Canada’s public infrastructure, and 
help bring Canada’s capital stock closer to an optimal level. First, there should be a broader 
implementation of user-pay models to help reduce the tax-financing costs that discourage public 
infrastructure spending. Second, a provincial body should be developed that would play an 
active role in evaluating provincial and municipal infrastructure, and act to prioritize financing 
for those projects which have the greatest merit, and for which public return on investment is 
greatest.
USER PAY AS A MEANS TO EFFICIENCY
Greater utilization of user-pay pricing models is essential if Canadian governments wish to 
encourage efficient levels of infrastructure development. As recalled from our earlier theoretical 
discussion of the rule for optimal infrastructure, the fundamental condition for optimal 
infrastructure is that the collective benefit of public provision should exceed the collective cost: 
optimal public infrastructure is determined at the point where the marginal return to capital is 
equal to the tax-adjusted cost of capital24. If we are to satisfy this condition, it is necessary that 
we embrace marginal pricing, not simply as a source of revenue, but as a mechanism to establish 
priced (efficient) demand, and to ensure that incentives for efficient use and decision making on 
the part of consumers are in place. 25
Unpriced access to infrastructure in Canada currently creates incentives for individuals to 
utilize public infrastructure beyond the point that individual benefits outweigh the associated 
public costs. By financing infrastructure through indirect means, such as income taxes, 
governments discourage efficient consumption/utilization decisions by individuals. The absence 
of direct marginal pricing breaks the link between individual costs and benefits, and eliminates 
any incentives for individuals to make efficient use of public infrastructure by adopting rationing 
and/or substitution strategies that would reduce over-utilization of congestible facilities. Pricing 
forces a trade-off in which an individual must consider if an additional unit of a good or service 
outweighs the cost necessary to acquire it. When this mechanism is obscured through indirect 
taxation there is no incentive for individuals utilize public goods and services efficiently, or in a 
manner that maximizes total public benefit. 
The absence of pricing also greatly diminishes the potential for efficient planning and 
prioritizing of public capital spending on the part of governments. 
Planning involves the evaluation of competing alternatives, each with varying cost and benefits 
characteristics. The problem here is that governments cannot honestly claim to know how their 
constituents collectively value one alternative over another, as constituents are never forced 
24 
This further implies that for inframarginal units of capital expenditure, public benefit is in excess of public costs, and that 
investment is optimal where the excess public benefit (surplus) is fully captured, and marginal benefits and costs are equal. 
25 
Here we do not discuss the implications of, or means of accounting for, the regressive effects of certain taxes. For a 
discussion of this topic, see P. Bazel & J. Mintz, “The Free Ride is Over: Why Cities, and Citizens, Must Start Paying for 
Much Needed Infrastructure,” SPP Research Papers, May 2014.
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reveal their collective preferences26. In a sense, a government cannot plan efficiently in the 
absence of efficient demand, and demand that is not informed by the true and full cost of goods 
and services is by definition inefficient. Governments are thus left to budget based on inefficient 
constituent demands for unpriced infrastructure. This creates political incentives to allocate 
funding away from capital priorities and essential services which are priced, in order to satisfy 
voter demands for the expansion of competing forms of unpriced infrastructure.
If we want to encourage the efficient use of public infrastructure, it is essential that prices reflect 
the full costs associated with individual demands and inform the choices that individuals make. 
Only when individual preferences are revealed in a priced context will governments or private 
developers know where, when and how much infrastructure is economically efficient. Only then 
can we move toward an optimal level and mix of core public infrastructure. 27
AN EXPANDED MANDATE FOR PROVINCIAL CAPITAL FINANCE AUTHORITIES 
It is important to recognize that over the past 60 years, municipalities have become increasingly 
responsible for the management, maintenance and provision of infrastructure. In our 2012 
paper “The Free Ride is Over”28 we take an extended look at this trend and its implications, 
highlighting the shift in capital stock held and financed by each order of government between 
1960 and 2011. We find that during this period, the municipally held share of the total public 
capital stock rose from roughly 22 to 49 per cent, and further that this shift of capital stock 
assets took place primarily from the federal level to the municipal level. Over this period, 
municipalities also saw increased federal and provincial transfers to help deal with the cost of 
their newly acquired responsibilities.29 30
In our 2012 paper, we present arguments concerning the problematic nature of 
intergovernmental transfers to fund capital projects. We continue to feel that intergovernmental 
transfers undermine political accountability by lowering the own source cost of provincial and 
municipal governments, and thus the political cost of capital projects.31 
26 Revealed preference is a basic economic concept which essentially says that we cannot know how much someone values 
a good or service until we force them to trade some of their hard-earned and limited resources (money) to attain it. In 
the context of public capital, this implies that a planner can only know how much someone (much less their collective 
constituents) values a good or service by forcing an incremental trade-off to attain incremental access, i.e. by pricing it. 
Furthermore, unless consumers are allowed to choose freely from among competing alternatives with varying benefit 
characteristics and costs, no one can honestly claim to know where they find value, or judge how they value a given good, 
relative to any other good, in a monetary sense.
27 
For an expanded discussion on the forms of infrastructure which are best suited to the use of user-pay financing models, 
please see the section entitled “User Fees” in our 2012 paper. 
28 
P. Bazel & J. Mintz, “The Free Ride is Over: Why Cities, and Citizens, Must Start Paying for Much Needed Infrastructure,” 
SPP Research Papers, May 2014.
29 
IBID. See the section entitled “Public Funding of Urban Infrastructure.”
30 
Our findings echo those of Harchaoui, Tarkhani and Warren: “Public Infrastructure in Canada, 1961-2002,” Canadian 
Public Policy/Analyse de politiques 30(3), 303-318, 2004. 
31 
For an extended discussion, see P. Bazel & J. Mintz, “The Free Ride is Over: Why Cities, and Citizens, Must Start Paying 
for Much Needed Infrastructure,” SPP Research Papers, May 2014.
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However, we recognize that Edward Gramlich32 and others have made the case that federal 
grants which account for the value of positive spillovers, or benefits accruing to users who do not 
reside in a particular jurisdiction, are justified, if measurable, insofar as they are proportionate 
to such spillovers. However, as provinces are constitutionally responsible for municipalities, 
we would argue that federal infrastructure funding should focus on federal responsibilities — 
especially with respect to transportation infrastructure.33
To this point, and consistent with our earlier work, we continue to see the potential for 
municipalities to undertake increased infrastructure development with their own source 
revenues, supplemented by provincial transfers when appropriate. 
Currently, a significant portion of municipal infrastructure is financed through a combination 
of federal and provincial government money that trickles down to municipalities in the form of 
conditional and unconditional capital grants. In addition, provinces also establish capital finance 
authorities to help municipalities access debt under preferential terms. 
With respect to municipal capital financing, the provinces create authorities (PCFA) that 
function as provincial lending institutions through which municipal governments can access 
debt to finance capital projects. PCFAs consolidate borrowing on behalf of many municipalities 
and issue rounds of bonds representing the collective municipal debt. In this way, municipalities 
are able to reduce the administrative and transaction costs associated with individual bond 
issuances, and are further benefited by access to the provinces’ preferential AAA borrowing 
rate. The PCFAs currently operate largely as passive institutions that simply lower the borrowing 
costs for municipalities. 
We believe that a new provincial institution with an expanded mandate could be built on this 
foundation. This institution would develop a common process for structuring loans and selecting 
projects from among municipal loan applications. Unlike the current passive PCFA, it would 
have the capacity to:
1) Prioritize financing for proposed capital projects which can be shown to contribute to 
efficiency and an optimal allocation of public resources;
2) The institution would have some degree of authority to offer financing incentives on a 
project-by-project basis for proposals that embrace efficient economic planning, such as user-
pay financing models and real-time variable pricing where appropriate;
3) The institution would retain a staff with the inbuilt capacity to evaluate and aid in the 
development of large-scale infrastructure projects from the perspectives of design, 
engineering, financing and economics. Proposal design aid and evaluation would be based 
on a transparent and open process, and driven by clearly defined merit-based criteria. This 
process would be designed to enhance the allocative efficiency of infrastructure resources. 
32 Edward Gramlich , “Infrastructure Investment: A Review Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXXII, September 
1994, pp. 1176-1196. 
33 We purposely stray from a discussion of the federal role in infrastructure spending. Some evidence suggests transportation 
infrastructure spillover effects are not significant across state boundaries for road and highway transportation, implying 
that provincial rather than state level grants are more appropriate to consider (E. Gramlich, “Infrastructure Investment: 
A Review Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXXII, September 1994, pp. 1176-1196). In a companion paper, 
B. Dahlby and E. Jackson focus on inter-governmental grants in “An Analysis of Federal Infrastructure Programs,” 
forthcoming 2015.
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This process would also aim to identify and work to minimize the allocation of capital based 
on short-term political incentives. 
As such, these new provincial institutions would have some ability to further lower the 
borrowing cost of municipal projects which contribute to efficiency. However, the mandate might 
allow for the extension of additional borrowing incentives for both public and private projects 
which can be shown to offer the potential for significant positive externalities, or contribute to 
social or environmental development goals. It is often impossible to fully monetize the benefit 
streams accruing to projects that generate positive spillovers, and though these projects may 
offer significant public benefits over and above the monetary return on investment, they may not 
be developed based on less competitive private returns to capital investment. As such, there can 
be underinvestment in these types of socially valuable projects which offer positive externalities 
but may not offer the most competitive return among a portfolio of competing investments. In 
this case, a provincial institution might be justified in lowering the cost of capital for a private 
project, subsidizing some degree of the borrowing cost, in effect increasing the project’s return 
to investment such that it is competitive from an investment standpoint. Though this role is not 
a central or necessary function of the institution we propose, such a role in subsidizing capital 
projects that can be shown to offer significant positive externalities would be justified on the 
grounds of economic efficiency, in that the total public return to the investment (subsidy for the 
project) would produce public benefits over and above the costs incurred. 
To restate the central function of the proposed provincial institution, at the most basic level it 
would consider municipal project proposals in contrast to one another, and in relation to larger 
development and economic principles established at the provincial level. Through this process, 
it would assess the degree to which projects competing for investment capital satisfy criteria for 
economic efficiency and optimal resource allocation, and should thus be given priority access to 
financing. Further additional financing incentives might be offered to incent design criteria such 
as utilization of user pay, rather than tax financing. Finally, as mentioned above, the mandate 
might be expanded to offer some degree of subsidy for private projects which include substantial 
social, environmental or development goals. This subsidy could potentially include simply 
passing on the province’s preferential borrowing cost for some degree of the project’s financing, 
effectively lowering borrowing cost and thus increasing the rate of return on the project.
We note that this evaluative body for public infrastructure could operate as a non-profit 
corporation. It would not have a banking function unless governments enabled the corporation 
to provide loans from public and private funding as well as financial surpluses generated by the 
corporation. Consumer pricing as discussed above would best create such financial surpluses. 
Outright privatization should also be pursued if the need for public ownership cannot be 
demonstrated. 
PROJECT SELECTION AND EVALUATION AT THE PROVINCIAL AND FEDERAL LEVEL
Though the type of institution discussed above would be designed in the context of capital 
financing for municipalities, much as the current capital finance authorities are, aspects of 
institution and its intended mandate would be equally suited to contribute to more effective 
provincial and federal project evaluation. As described above, provincial and federal 
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governments can already directly access debt financing on preferential terms, and thus this 
aspect of the provincial-municipal institution is not relevant for provincial and federal projects. 
However, we would argue that provincial and federal governments could produce more effective 
infrastructure outcomes in Canada if similar federal and provincial institutions with mandates to 
undertake arm’s-length, criteria-based evaluation of large-scale capital projects and competing 
financing proposals were implemented. These institutions would be organized around a common 
process for project evaluation and would play an active role in the evaluation and prioritization 
of competing infrastructure priorities, embedded in an institution at arm’s length from 
government. They would function according to the same mandate described above and help 
Canada’s federal and provincial governments approach a more optimal level and distribution of 
infrastructure resources. 
The institution would also retain a staff with the inbuilt capacity to evaluate and aid in the 
development of large-scale infrastructure projects from the perspectives of design, engineering, 
financing and economics. Project evaluation would be based on a common approach to a 
transparent and arm’s-length process driven by clearly defined criteria and based on project 
merit. This process would be designed to enhance the allocative efficiency of infrastructure 
resources, and would also aim to identify and work to minimize the allocation of capital based 
on political influence and incentives.
The federal government continues to administer important infrastructure projects such as border 
facilities (Windsor bridge, ports, etc.), as do the provincial governments (highway networks, 
health, education). So a body at the federal level makes sense just as at the provincial level.
CONCLUSIONS
In undertaking an analysis of the determinants of adequate public capital stock, or optimal 
public capital spending, it is necessary to consider both the degree to which governments 
have undertaken the privatization of core public infrastructure, and the degree to which they 
may privatize further. If governments in Canada wish to advance the quality of core public 
infrastructure, at present the greatest potential to do so may well be to accelerate the trend which 
has been witnessed in the past 35 years, and re-examine areas of core public infrastructure 
which might be shifted from public to private supply by the implementation of user pricing. 
In this paper we have developed and presented a rule for determining the optimal level of public 
infrastructure. This rule suggests that the optimum is achieved when the marginal return to 
infrastructure investments is equal to the cost of debt finance, accounting for the economic cost 
of taxation. We wish to note here that the economic cost of taxation is (or should be) a non-trivial 
concern for governments, and that where possible, governments would benefit their constituents 
by implementing user-pay models of finance for public capital, rather than relying on indirect 
income taxation that reduces the returns to productive activity. 
Looking at the Canadian experience over the past 20-25 years, we must conclude that it is highly 
likely declining levels of investment into the late 1990s saw Canada underinvest in its public 
capital stock. However, at present, Canada is one of the largest spenders on infrastructure among 
the OECD countries, and this effort to renew Canada’s capital stock has tangibly reduced the 
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average age of infrastructure. In addition, Canada has made a significant shift from public to 
private infrastructure for certain services, particularly communications and broadband, where 
public infrastructure is now a very small portion of total infrastructure spending. 
Finally, we have presented two possible avenues that we urge policy makers to consider as they 
work to address Canada’s infrastructure needs in the coming years. Most essential is simply a 
move away from tax financing, in favour of a greater reliance on direct consumer pricing for 
infrastructure. In addition, we advocate for the development of a more transparent approach to 
measuring the cost-benefit returns to public infrastructure spending, through the adoption of 
public bodies that evaluate and prioritize projects independent of the political incentives and 
vote-getting of priorities which often shape capital budgets.
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